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ABSTRACT
Seven years after the annexation of Crimea and amid an ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia 
has tried to move towards military escalation in the Donbass region making clear that 
the status quo emerged in 2014 as a “new normal” cannot last. The Minsk II Agreement 
negotiated between Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany in the framework of the Normandy 
Format in February 2015 remains unimplemented despite numerous rounds of mediation. 
Western economic sanctions against Moscow succeeded in limiting the Kremlin’s military 
advance beyond Donbass and deterred it from making further territorial gains. However, 
these measures failed to impact on Russian decision-making regarding resolution of the 
conflict. Influencing Russia’s foreign policy is not an easy task, as the country’s conduct 
of international relations is shaped by domestic factors and the authoritarian nature of its 
governance. Still, the West needs a strategy in response to the international and domestic 
wrongdoings already committed by the Kremlin and as a preventative measure to deter 
Moscow’s future aggression. In order to face the Russian challenge, the West should first 
design clear rules for its own foreign-policy behaviour based on the primacy of human rights 
and democracy and then define how to defend universal values abroad, including in Russia. 
Only after, it could structure a transatlantic strategy along the following lines: active United 
States–European Union involvement in the Normandy Format aimed at the fulfilment of 
the Minsk II Agreement, strengthening Ukraine’s resilience in developing democracy and 
its military and energy sectors and finally improving sanctions mechanisms against the 
Kremlin.
Nona Mikhelidze is Senior Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). She holds a PhD in Political 
Science from Scuola normale superiore (Pisa), and a M.A. in Regionalism: Central Asia and Caucasian 
Studies from the Humboldt University Berlin (HU), where she was awarded with the Volkswagen 
Foundation Scholarship as a Research Fellow. She holds also B.A. and M.A. degrees in International 
Relations from the Tbilisi State University. Since 2020 she writes for the newspaper La Stampa on 
Russia and the post-Soviet space. Her research interests include the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) and conflict resolution in the South Caucasus, the Wider Black Sea and regional cooperation, 
Turkey and Caspian Region, and Russian foreign policy in the Post-Soviet space.
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INTRODUCTION
Seven years after the annexation of Crimea and amid an ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia is moving to-
wards military escalation in the Donbass region. One can only speculate as to the final goal of this latest 
move. Conjecture varies from attempts at intimidation to a localized military operation in order to then 
deploy Russian “peacekeepers”, to a large-scale war aimed at the incorporation of Ukraine’s Donetsk and 
Lugansk regions into the Russian Federation.
One thing is clear: the status quo that emerged in 2014 as a “new normal” cannot last in the long run. 
The Minsk II Agreement negotiated between Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany in the framework of 
the Normandy Format in February 2015 remains unimplemented despite numerous rounds of media-
tion. Western economic sanctions against Moscow, which include asset freezes and visa bans aimed 
at individuals and companies, as well as broader restrictions on specific economic sectors of Russia, 
succeeded in limiting the Kremlin’s military advance beyond Donbass and deterred it from making fur-
ther territorial gains – including the strategically important Black Sea port of Mariupol. However, these 
measures failed to impact on Russian decision-making regarding resolution of the conflict.
Influencing Russia’s foreign policy is not an easy task, as the country’s conduct of international relations 
is shaped by domestic factors and the authoritarian nature of its governance. Current military tensions 
on the Ukraine–Russia border coincide with political conditions inside Russia linked to the case of oppo-
sition leader Alexei Navalny and human-rights issues, as well as to the state of the economy following 
the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent social pressure. The nexus between Russian foreign and 
domestic policy is evident now in the same way that it was in 2011–12, when internal protests drasti-
cally changed Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s international posture and relations with the West along a 
confrontational pattern, and in 2014 when Putin (by then president once again) decided to defend his 
Ukrainian counterpart, Viktor Yanukovych, to affirm his own strength and credibility at home.
Today the regime once again “feels” that is “attacked” by the West on many fronts – be it regarding Na-
valny, human-rights issues or Belarus, to say nothing of US President Joe Biden’s calling Putin a “killer”. 
MILITARY ESCALATION IN UKRAINE AND 
RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC CONTEXT
The signs of an imminent military escalation in Ukraine’s Donbass region have been evident for months. 
In January, 2021, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made it clear that if France and Germany do 
not force Ukraine to implement the Minsk II Agreement, Russia will reserve the right to act “accordingly” 
(Shatrov 2021). In the same month, at the “Russian Donbass Forum” organized by the secessionist Re-
public of Donetsk, the editor-in-chief of Russia Today, Margarita Simonyan, declared that the time had 
come to “bring Donbass back home to Mother Russia” (Radio Svoboda 2021).
Russia subsequently started moving troops and weapons close to the border with Ukraine and inside 
Crimea, while Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu announced that, in accordance with the training plan of 
the country’s armed forces, control checks had begun in its military command and units (The Minister 
of Defence of the Russian Federation 2021). According to Ukrainian sources, the Kremlin deployed a 
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total of 28 battalion tactical groups. Moscow’s motivations were to “defend” the Russian citizens of the 
Donetsk and Lugansk regions (who are Ukrainian nationals but to whom the Kremlin handed Russian 
passports). At the beginning of April 2021, the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) recorded a total of 1,021 ceasefire violations in the conflict 
zone – including over 500 explosions (OSCE 2021).
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called on Russia to stop flexing its muscles and seek a peace-
ful solution to the conflict. In response, Lavrov warned against “the destruction of Ukraine” (Deutsche 
Welle 2021a), while a Kremlin’s spokesperson said that Russia was moving troops on its territory as it 
pleased. Later, President Putin and Defence Minister Shoigu met in the Siberian taiga for a weekend trip. 
The state media showed their pleasant walk in the forest. It was hard to believe that the meeting’s goal 
was simply to take a breath of fresh air, as their weekend jaunt coincided with local media starting to 
disseminate messages about “Ukraine preparing for war”.
The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) reacted promptly to the escalation in Donbass. 
On April 10 Germany and France invited Russia to attend a meeting of the OSCE in order to make clear 
that its military exercises on the Ukrainian border were not aimed at full-scale war. However, Moscow 
declined the invitation and refused to participate (Euobserver 2021).
As stated at the outset, the intentions behind the Kremlin’s military manoeuvres on the Ukraine–Russia 
border are a matter for speculation. They could be an intimidating move against Zelensky, as well as an 
attempt to test newly inaugurated US President Biden’s readiness to provide assistance to the Ukrainians 
in resisting Russian aggression. It seems more likely that the Russian government is simply trying to di-
vert international and domestic attention away from domestic issues and onto a possible war in Ukraine.
In view of Russia’s upcoming parliamentary elections in September 2021 and the deteriorating so-
cio-economic context, the Kremlin has already grown anxious and begun to crack down on political life 
and the activities of its citizens. In February 2021, President Putin signed a highly controversial bill (ex-
panding on earlier legislation) aimed at labelling non-governmental organizations (NGOs), media outlets, 
journalists and human-rights activists receiving overseas grants as “foreign agents” – that is, individuals 
suspected of being engaged “in the interests of a foreign state” (The Russian Federation 2021). Under 
the new legislation restrictions have been imposed on public demonstrations and blocking the streets 
has been criminalized. Reasons for being recognized as “foreign agents” include participating in political 
debates, expressing views on state policies, campaigning for certain results in an election and partici-
pating as election observers in the interests of a foreign entity. Such “agents” are required to report on 
their activities, which will then undergo a scrutinized financial audit; furthermore, all must be referred to 
as “foreign agents” whenever they appear in the media. They are banned from working in public service 
or applying for any government position (RFE/RL 2021a). By 7 April, the Roskomnadzor state monitoring 
agency had issued a total of 390 protocols against Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) for failing 
to mark its materials as outputs of “foreign agents”, with the court upholding about 260 of the protocols 
with total fines approaching $1 million (RFE/RL 2021b).
Repression has come as a response to months-long anti-government protests, which broke out first in 
Khabarovsk, in Russia’s Far East, after its popular governor was arrested on allegedly spurious charges 
of murder. These were followed by demonstrations in support of Navalny after his arrest and the release 
of the film Putin’s Palace, which denounces corruption deals associated with an extravagant palatial 
complex allegedly built for the Russian president. Protests were held in 198 towns and cities across 
Russia, in some of the largest anti-government demonstrations since 2011–12.
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According to the World Bank, the COVID-19 pandemic has brought negative economic outcomes in Rus-
sia leading to an eventual rise in social pressure at the loss of jobs in manufacturing and construction, 
retail and hospitality services as well as an increase in the national poverty rate (The World Bank 2021). 
In polls conducted by the Levada Center at the beginning of February, 43% of respondents considered 
that the main motivation for participating in these protests is general dissatisfaction with state policy. 
About 45% said that they expect further such protests in the future (Levada.ru 2021).
As the organization of pro-Navalny protests has been facilitated by social media, the Russian govern-
ment decided to address the “problem” by slowing down Twitter. Additionally, it called for Google, Face-
book and Telegram to delete posts urging young people to take part in banned protests (Euronews 
2021).
Social, economic and political hardships have found their reflection in Putin’s approval rating. If in April 
2018 the approval rate had been 82%, three years later – February 2021 – it had fallen to 65% (Statista.
com 2021). Back in 2014, with the annexation of Crimea, and then in 2015, with the war in Syria, the 
Kremlin managed to reinforce its legitimacy and increase its popularity in Russian eyes. However, with 
COVID-19 and all the aforementioned socio-political challenges, the “Crimea effect” has evaporated and 
there is an urgent need to distract the Russian people from internal problems and divert their gaze to 
tensions abroad.
Meanwhile Navalny, having been on hunger strike since March 31 as the authorities continue to refuse 
to provide him with an adequate medical treatment, is dying in prison. “His life is hanging by a thread. 
We don’t know how much longer he can hold out,” Navalny’s allies reported while calling for mass pro-
tests (Tétrault-Farber and Osborn 2021). The EU as well as individual member states called for Navalny 
receiving immediate medical assistance. French President Emmanuel Macron declared world powers 
should draw “clear red lines” (Ibid) with the Kremlin, while the US warned that Russia would face “conse-
quences” if Navalny dies (France24 2021).
LOOKING BACK AT THE DETERIORATION 
OF WEST–RUSSIA RELATIONS
Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 there have been a number of Western attempts to reset 
relations with Moscow. All of them have failed despite a series of conciliatory measures taken by the 
West to the Kremlin. NATO enlargement to include Ukraine and Georgia has been frozen. The US and the 
EU remained passive, if not totally absent, in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, eventually 
allowing Russia to deploy its “peacekeeper” forces following the war of autumn 2020. Some EU coun-
tries have seemed to accommodate Russian interests in Libya (and in Africa, more generally) and in 
Serbia (Popescu 2021). Russia has been accepted back into the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe. Western sanctions have usually targeted the wrong personalities, with limited influence on 
Russia’s political or economic life. Nord Stream 2, the gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea linking Russia 
to Germany that German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier has defined as “one of the last bridges 
between Russia and Europe” is nearing completion (Bildt et al. 2021) despite its economic rationale 
being highly dubious or even non-existent (Nixey 2021). Before the Navalny case, France called for stra-
tegic engagement with Russia, and Italy appealed for enhanced economic cooperation. Summing up, 
in response to Russia’s foreign aggression and its growing authoritarianism at home, the EU has kept 
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seeking a selective engagement, which, however, has generally resulted in acquiescence to the Kremlin’s 
actions in the post-Soviet space (Bildt et al. 2021).
The last visit of Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), to Moscow was a practical demonstration 
of Brussels’ accommodating policy towards Russia. While Borrell had hoped to find some common 
ground, the Kremlin used his visit to humiliate the EU. Lavrov called the EU an unreliable partner trying 
to interfere in Russia’s domestic policy. He slammed Brussels for its sanctions policy and argued that 
the EU was using methods from the colonial past. The lowest point of the visit came when a Sputnik 
journalist with a provocative question forced Borrell to condemn US policy towards Cuba and to highlight 
the differences between Brussels and Washington (Seskuria 2021). The very same day, Russia expelled 
EU diplomats from Germany, Sweden and Poland for allegedly attending pro-Navalny demonstrations 
in Moscow. On his return journey, Borrell inferred that Moscow was not interested in engaging in a 
constructive dialogue with the EU – a conclusion that could have been reached as far back as 2012. 
Moscow has since time and again demonstrated that it has no interest in meaningful and constructive 
dialogue with the West.
Relations between the US and Russia have progressively deteriorated since the early 2000s. With hind-
sight, the point of no return was arguably in 2011-12, when internal protests and NATO’s intervention 
in Libya convinced Putin that the US policy was bent to oust him from power and keep Russia sub-
dued abroad.  The annexation of Crimea in 2014, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the Kremlin’s alleged 
interference in domestic politics and, especially in the elections of the countries of the transatlantic 
community all prove the point. In 2014, the US imposed punitive sanctions on Russia, trying to increase 
and strengthen them from year to year and eventually targeting Nord Stream 2 itself. “The Congress of 
the United Stated is literally overwhelmed by the desire to do everything to destroy US-Russia relations”, 
Foreign Minister Lavrov commented at the time (CNBC 2019). The situation worsened further after the 
Skripal case in 2018 (involving the poisoning of a former Russian military officer/double agent and his 
daughter in the United Kingdom (UK)) and, similarly, in recent months after Navalny’s poisoning with 
the nerve agent Novichok and his subsequent arrest. In late 2020, Washington claimed that a group of 
hackers backed by the Russian intelligence agency SVR had carried out a serious cyberattack on the 
US federal government, while a declassified US intelligence report stated in March that Russia had at-
tempted to manipulate the 2020 US presidential election with a view to keeping Donald Trump in power.
LOOKING FORWARD: HOW TO DEAL 
WITH UKRAINE, BUT MAINLY WITH 
RUSSIA?
All observers in Washington are aware that the Russian challenge is here to stay, whereas the EU 
still seems hesitant to accept that its relations with the Kremlin will not improve while Russia is gov-
erned by President Putin and his vertical power structure (Rumer and Weiss 2021). In response to 
the recent military tensions on the Ukraine–Russia border, Germany and France issued a joint bland 
statement expressing concern over growing ceasefire violations in which they called on both parties 
to show restraint and work towards a peaceful solution (Deutsche Welle 2021b). Yet, it is all too clear 
who is the aggressor and who is the victim: it was Russia, not Ukraine, that moved its troops to the 
border.
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In contrast, US President Biden first called President Putin a killer and then declared that the days 
of “Russian aggression” were over. While on a call to President Zelensky, he promised “the Unit-
ed States’ unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” (The White House 
2021a). Additionally, the US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin told his Ukrainian counterpart that 
“the United States [would] not leave Ukraine alone in the [the] event of escalation of Russian aggres-
sion” (Ministry of Defence of Ukraine 2021).
During a meeting between US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and HR/VP Borrell, the parties 
pledged to “address in a coordinated manner Russia’s challenging behaviour, including its ongoing 
aggression against Ukraine and Georgia”. Moreover, the allies declared their commitment to the 
defence of human rights in Russia while at the same time being ready to engage with Moscow on 
issues of common interest (U.S. Department of State 2021).
These words have to be followed by concrete steps, however, as there is a need for a new transat-
lantic strategy towards Ukraine, but mainly towards Russia. In the light of his last trip to Moscow, 
EU HR/VP Borrell has said that Brussels will push back, contain and engage the Kremlin. In order to 
transform these words into policy, the EU should first design clear rules for its own foreign-policy 
behaviour based on the primacy of human rights and democracy and then define how to defend 
universal values abroad, including in Russia.
Defining rules for Western foreign-policy behaviour: Putting democracy back onto the global agenda
“As pressure is mounting on democracy, the rule of law and human rights globally, the EU is working 
actively to protect, inspire and support democracies around the world” and it is in the EU’s “strategic 
interests in advancing its global leadership on human rights and democracy … [to be] a champion of 
the rules based multilateral order”, says the Union’s Democracy Action Plan published in December 
2020 (European Commission 2021). Backsliding on democracy is evident in a number of countries; 
therefore, the document emphasizes further, it is high time for the EU to deliver “a new geopolitical 
agenda on human rights and democracy” (Ibid).
Indeed, acting internally and externally in the name of democratic values and in defence of human 
rights would be a way to build strength, credibility and respect when practising foreign policy – and 
especially in engaging with Russia and the countries of its shared neighbourhood. Credibility, in par-
ticular, has been undermined by the leaders of some EU member states, who on the one hand pledge 
their support for the defence of human rights and on the other hand have continued to flirt with auto-
crats. This was the case, for example, with President Macron courting Egyptian leader Abdel Fattah 
al-Sisi at the same time as the EU published its European Democracy Action Plan.
In dealing with the EU’s Eastern European neighbours and addressing the Russian challenge, EU–US 
coordination is crucial. Biden’s proactive position on democracy promotion and the determination of 
the US Administration to address Russian malign activities abroad represent an opportunity for the 
EU to increase transatlantic coordination on these issues.
According to the US interim National Security Strategy Guidance 2021, the West needs the revitaliza-
tion of democracy as an instrument to meet all global challenges (The White House 2021b). Leading 
the world through the promotion of democracy is in the “undeniable self-interest” of the American 
people, as it reduces instability and violence abroad (Ibid). Yet democracy continues to be challenged 
by authoritarian states trying to promote their own model of governance through disinformation and 
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the weaponizing of corruption. In this sense, Russia remains an actor playing a disruptive role on the 
global stage. In the same document, the US recommits itself to the transatlantic partnership in order 
to deter authoritarian regimes and their aggressive policies in the field of cybersecurity, disinforma-
tion infrastructure and energy coercion. Real costs will be imposed on anyone who interferes in the 
democratic processes of Western countries (Ibid). 
In March 2021 the UK also published its “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Re-
view of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy”, declaring that the UK is committed 
to protecting human rights and upholding global norms worldwide (European Commission 2021). 
London perceives Russia as the “most acute threat” to the security of the NATO members, and 
calls for deterrence. Therefore, it promises to uphold international rules and norms and to hold 
Moscow accountable for breaches of these. In this context, the UK declares its readiness to sup-
port Eastern neighbourhood countries, especially Ukraine, in strengthening the capacity of their 
armed forces (Ibid).
Thus, in the US/UK’s understanding, promoting democracy and defending human rights would be a 
way to support Eastern European countries (in this case, Ukraine) on their path towards democra-
tization and, at the same time, a tool to address the Russian challenge. However, in order to make 
this approach effective, coherence and coordination is needed between the US, the EU and the UK.
Concrete steps to deter Russia’s aggression in Ukraine
Trying to predict what President Putin will or will not do in Ukraine, or regarding further repression 
of fundamental freedoms in his country, is a useless exercise. The West needs a strategy in order 
to face the challenges that he has already posed to the transatlantic community. Russia’s treat-
ment of Navalny and its harsh repression of protesters – and, more generally, its handling of civil 
society – require an urgent review of the EU’s guiding principles for engaging the Kremlin. Such a 
strategy will serve as a response to the international and domestic wrongdoings already commit-
ted and as a preventative measure to deter the Kremlin’s future aggression. 
A transatlantic strategy could be structured along the following lines. Firstly, active US–EU involve-
ment in the Normandy Format aimed at the fulfilment of the Minsk II Agreement. When current 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel leaves her post later in 2021, the format will lose its political 
weight; therefore, there is a need for active US involvement. The ideal solution would see Germany 
and France replaced by a strong EU. A second priority would be to strengthen Ukraine’s resilience in 
developing democracy and its military and energy sectors, which brings us to the final point – im-
provement of the sanctions mechanism against Russia through the inclusion of Russian oligarchs 
and the suspension of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. 
Additionally, sanctions should be applied to the judges responsible for the Navalny-related repres-
sion. Visa bans and asset freezes on state officials who will never travel to Europe or the US make 
no sense and only undermine Western credibility. Recently President Biden received a letter from 
Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation including a list of oligarchs and state authorities allegedly in-
volved in political persecution, human-rights abuses and corruption. This letter asked Washington 
to consult the list when selecting personalities to be sanctioned. Moreover, the US, together with 
the UK, could consider limiting or fully restricting participation or trading by US/UK persons in any 
new Russian sovereign-debt issuance (O’Toole and Fried 2021).
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More generally, sanctions must become a tool for affirming the supremacy of universal values over 
political opportunism and an instrument for punishing violators. Thus, they should be imposed as a 
response to Russia’s actions in order to limit the Kremlin’s aggression in Ukraine and to discourage 
further repression of civil society in Russia. When imposed in 2014–15, sanctions were perhaps not 
effective in terms of their policy impact on Russia, but arguably they prevented the Kremlin from 
further escalation and military adventurism in Ukraine at that time.
A punitive approach towards the Kremlin does not necessary imply that the EU or the US should 
avoid selective engagement with Russia, but it should indeed be selective – meaning on limited 
issues (e.g. the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty and climate change) and at a multilat-
eral level in the framework of international organizations.
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